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BRITAIN, BLACKS, AND BUSING
.Derrick Bell*

DOING Gooo BY DOING LITTLE: RACE AND SCHOOLING IN
BRITAIN. By .David L. Kirp. Berkeley: University of California
Press. 1979. Pp. xi, 164. $11.95.

-

"Do something even if it's wrong," is a nonsensical, usually
counterproductive, but nevertheless frequently followed admonition
that accurately describes this country's current school desegregation
policy. Here we are twenty-seven years after the Supreme Court first
acknowledged what blacks had always known: that coerced school
segregation is a constitutional wrong and an educational evil. 1 And
yet today, proponents and opponents of racial balance and busing
remedies still defend or attack these techniques with a frenzy far out
of proportion to their importance in obtaining the equal educational
opportunity proinised in Brown.
And as the battle over busing rages, it is quite clear that its outcome will not alter the demographic facts which render the busing
debate so irrelevant to so many minority children. More than half of
the nation's minority children attend schools in urban districts which
are approximately 60% nonwhite and therefore beyond the possibility of integrating on the racial balance model. The average minority
population in the nation's ten largest districts was 68.2% five years
ago and is likely higher today. 2
Nor has the resistance to school desegregation lessened. Antibusing riders and other legislative schemes designed to discourage
school desegregation policies remain popular in the Congress. 3
States have enacted laws and even amended their constitutions in
efforts to ban or substantially limit busing for school desegregation. 4
\

• Dean, University of Oregon Law School. A.B. 1952, Duquesne University; LL.B. 1957,
University of Pit~burgh. - Ed.
I. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Ravitch, The "White Flight" Controversy, 51 Pue. INTEREST 135, 146-47 (1978). The
nonwhite population of Britain, about 3% of the total population, is far smaller than that of
America, in which 15% of the population are minorities (p. I 17).
3. Efforts to attach anti-busing riders to appropriations bills delayed the adjournment of
the lame-duck session of the 96th Congress. See, e.g., Senate Props Curb on U.S. Busing Suits
.from Financing Bill, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1980, at I, col. I.
4. See, e.g., North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971), affirming a
lower court order striking down a statute that prohibited assignment or involuntary busing of
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Although the courts, including the Supreme Court, have not abandoned the Brown mandate in the face of widespread opposition, the
days when the Supreme Court spoke with one voice in resolving
school desegregation issues are long passed. 5 Slim majorities are
found to affirm most school desegregation orders, but only on the
basis that the facts of those cases reach restrictive standards of liability that cannot be satisfied in those districts where metropolitan remedies hold the only hope for classical desegregation through racial
balance techniques. 6 There is even less chance that further relief can
be obtained in systems where once desegregated schools not uncommonly become resegregated through white flight and changes in
neighborhood and racial patterns. 7
Black parents have become disenchanted with the slow progress
of school desegregation. They recognize, often to a greater extent
than civil rights lawyers, the small gains in academic achievement
that come from the large sacrifice involved in sending black children
across town to mainly white schools. 8 While the Supreme Court has
not found it necessary to hear any of the cases raising the issue, it is
quite possible that within the next year or so, it will be faced with the
paradox of black parents who have gone to court in order to prevent
school boards from assigning black children to mainly white schools.
students to create a racial balance. California, by a November 1971 referendum, amended its
constitution to prohibit its state courts from ordering racial balance and busing remedies unless federal courts in similar circumstances would be authorized under the federal Constitution
to order such remedies. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7 (West 1980).
5. See generally, Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in tl1e
Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. I (1979).
Actually, the effort to issue unanimous decisions lasted only a decade after Brown. Justices
Clark and Harlan added a one-sentence dissent in Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218
(1964). The Court spoke unanimously in both Greene v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430
(1968), and in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971). Beginning
with Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), the close 5-4 decision reversing a metropolitanwide desegregation plan, divided decisions became expected rather than exceptional. Indeed,
in an earlier case with metropolitan-type relief in issue, an equally divided Court affirmed the
lower court's refusal of relief in Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103 (1965). See also Dayton
Board of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (5-4 decision); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (7-2 decision). And in its most recent effort, the Court could not
finally agree that it wanted to decide the appeal of Dallas, Texas, school case, in litigation
stretching back to 1953. Tasby v. Estes, 572 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom.
Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 440 U.S. 906 (1979), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 444 U.S. 437 (1980).
6. Compare Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) with Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
7. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
8. Reasons why plaintiffs' lawyers in school cases may continue seeking racial balance
remedies in opposition to black parents' preferences are discussed in Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J.
470 (1976). The uncertain effects of school desegregation are reviewed in N. ST. JOHN,
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN (1975).

March 1981)

Britain, Blacks, and Busing

837

These parents will not be urging a reversal of Brown, but they will be
insisting on a reading of Brown that emphasizes equal educational
opportunity directly rather than the traditional call for racial balance
with educational opportunity serving as an assumed by-product. 9
Through it all, civil rights agencies committed to bringing about
an integrated society through the mechanism of school desegregation
remain steadfast. They are deterred neither by political opposition,
judicial weariness on the issues, nor critics within the civil rights
ranks. 10 But the situation grows worse. Even in most desegregated
settings, racial understanding has not improved. Indeed, quite the
opposite result has too often been the case.
Given the current confusion, it is not unreasonable to try to determine whether other countries have faced similar racial problems
in their public schools, and resolved them with greater efficiency and
sensitivity than has been the case here. Professor David L. Kirp, a
long-time observer of the desegregation scene in this country, has led
the search for other answers with an interesting review of the British
experience. 11
.Doing Good By .Doing Little is the result of Kirp's investigation.
He brings a cold and sometimes disconcerting objectivity to his findings, but in the end, his approach perhaps makes a greater impact
because the reader is led to reach conclusions that are not only obvious, but also discouraging. For it is apparent that in both Britain
and the United States, school policies are influenced by priorities
that favor white over nonwhite interests whenever a choice between
the two must be made. This is not to minimize the substantially different dimensions of the race problem in British schools. But there
are parallels that recall and sometimes reflect the American experience. Not the least of these similarities is the obstacles faced by both
countries in reconciling racial equality rhetoric with the political
9. The Supreme Court has agreed to review a case brought by black parents in Chicago
who were barred from enrolling their children in the high schools near their residences by the
working of the Board's voluntary desegregation plan that set a ceiling on the number of blacks
permitted to attend the two high schools in order to forestall white flight. The Board modified
the plan to provide free bus transportation to other integrated high schools for black children
excluded from the schools where the racial quota was in effect. The court of appeals affirmed
the district court's approval of this plan. Johnson v. Board of Educ., 604 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3055 (1980), vacated, 101 S. Ct. 339 (Oct. 20, 1980).
10. Serious questions regarding the continued viability of racial balance remedies and educationally oriented alternatives are discussed in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (D. BELL ed. 1980).

I l. See, e.g., Kirp, Fine & Angelides, .Desegregation, Politics, and the Courts: Race and
Schooling Policy in Richmond, Cal!fomia, 88 AM. J. Eouc. 32 (1979); Kirp, Race, Politics, and
the Courts: School .Desegregation in San Francisco, 46 HARV. Eouc. REV. 572 (1976).
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pressures that impede direct responses to the educational needs of
minority children.
In the United States, the ringing promise of equal educational
opportunity for black children ·through integration with whites has
not been implemented because of white opposition, much of it motivated by the fear that integrated schools would narrow the educational opportunities of white children.
In England, the numbers of nonwhite children were, until relatively recently, so small that policymakers concluded that their
schooling could be accomplished through racially nonspecific
processes. Kirp reports it was not until about 1960 that Great Britain
began to experience a significan~ immigration of nonwhite peoples
from the "new Commonwealth" countries of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the West Indies. As the percentage of nonwhite residents increased, Britain appeared to recognize its new multicultural
and multiracial character, but felt that the responsibilities that accompanied such diversity could be carried out under the general policies under which the self-styled "Welfare State" had assumed to
insure the collective well-being of all its inhabitants.
Britain, Kirp tells us, felt a sense of obligation to these less well
educated, working-class immigrants, but it also felt it important not
to single out one group for special treatment to avoid charges of favoritism. "Moreover, Britons did not regard this group as having a
particular claim on the public fisc. The dilemmas of social class
were familiar; the unique dilemmas of race were not generally acknowledged" (p. 23).
To be successful, the official policy on race also had to be responsive to the tensions between the actual and the preferred self images
of the English people. From all indications, the British still harbor a
paranoid resentment at the loss of their imperial grandeur. On the
one hand, they regard themselves as a superior people. This is evidenced by their paternalistic rule in the past and, as will be shown
here, their high-handed approach to race relations in the present.
But the British also perceive themselves as a very tolerant, liberal
people. They are quick to distinguish their treatment of nonwhites
from that of the United States by noting the lack of an official discriminatory policy based on race. It is true, there is no official Jim
Crow policy in modem England. However, tolerance to the British
means encouraging complete cultural assimilation of nonwhites, not
an acceptance of distinctive identities. The latter, Kirp points out,
would require the hosts themselves to change. The British policy of
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racial inexplicitness represents a compromise among all these concerns.
Racial inexplicitness is a deliberate policy to "diminish the significance of race, to act insofar as was possible without explicit attention to race by noting the shared and nonracial vulnerabilities of
needy people" (p. 24). It is an official recognition of the existence of
nonwhites and their special needs without a commitment to work
with or for minorities, as minorities. In fact, the policy is so "neutral" as to race that its nonwhite beneficiaries were not consulted
during the determination of this governmental response to their
needs. Kirp attributes this lack of input to the politically disorganized and culturally dissimilar nonwhite community. Perhaps. But
the lack of consultation also reflects a continuation of the paternalistic attitudes of the British toward their colored citizens.
Professor Kirp's attraction to racially inexplicit school policies is
not lessened by the presumptions that accompany their imposition
on nonwhite people. Patronizing means are evidently justified to
reach educationally impressive ends. And public education in Britain has come a long way in a few generations.
Professor Kirp reports that the roots of British race and schooling
policy lie in the transition from an elitist to an egalitarian philosophy
of education. Until the post-World War II era, the elitist philosophy
dominated. Education was provided strictly along class lines. While
a grade school education was available to most children, albeit for a
fee, few lower or middle class children continued their education beyond age fourteen. The philosophy of education for the lower
classes, which was to teach them to discharge the duties assigned
them, reflected this elitism. The 1944 Education Act marked the
transition to a more egalitarian approach to public education. The
Act provided for a universal education to age sixteen, abolished fees
in state-maintained schools, and ended the distinction between elementary and secondary schools. This more egalitarian attitude enabled more careful consideration of educational needs of poorer,
nonwhite children than would have been possible in the pre-Education Act era.
The policy of racial inexplicitness has been carried out within the
context of egalitarian reform of public education. "The aim of British policy has been, on the one hand, to stress the infinitely diverse
needs of individual students, and, on the other, to imbed race in
some broader policy context, such as educational disadvantage" (p.
40). For example, educational services destined almost exclusively
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for nonwhite children, such as intensive instruction in the English
language, were described as programs for "special needs" children.
The original rationale for special attention was to promote assimilation, to "render the newcomers at ease with their surroundings by
making them over into Britons" (p. 45). But, by the mid- l 960s,
"[t]he rhetoric of assimilation was ultimately too inconsistent with
presumed British tolerance of diversity, and too unpalatable to nonwhites, to endure - at least as official policy" (p. 46). A new policy
called for equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an
atmosphere of mutual tolerance.
In reality, K.irp concedes, there has been minimal tolerance and
recognition of cultural differences. School officials resisted suggestions that native languages be taught in the schools. Black studies
proposals received a similarly cool reception. Such ventures were
seen as inconsistent with the concern for integration, and in no way
helpful in achieving the education goal. "Multiculturalism was apparently to be confined to the symbolic gesture . . . . To do otherwise," K.irp was told, "risked catering to intellectual weakness, as
well as promoting social divisiveness" (p. 48). Educational improvement and becoming familiar with British ways were seen as synonymous.
By the late 1960s, as a result of the increasingly restrictive (and
racist) British immigration laws, there were far fewer "newcomers."
However, minorities continued to perform more poorly in school
than their white counterparts. The discouraging achievement scores
did not shake school officials' commitment to racially inexplicit solutions for the problems of minority children, who were first designated "urban deprived children," and later "educationally
disadvantaged children" (p. 49).
Kirp reports that factors of belief and bureaucracy undergird racially inexplicit school policies. First, there is a deep-seated ideological commitment to universalism in social services. The British feel
that there is a social stigma placed on having to declare oneself
needy as a prerequisite to receiving schooling or medical care. They
feel that such selectivity equates need with fault and stigmatizes the
recipient. In a universalist view, an "individual's entitlement to social service has no relationship to social status . . ." (p. 58). When
faced with limited resources, which by necessity requires some "positive discrimination," the allocation of such scarce resources is done
by choosing some-needy area rather than needy individuals.
Second, there is a pronounced political and bureaucratic preference for consensual and incremental decision making. Consultation
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is a way of life in Britain and change occurs through nuances rather
than through bold initiatives. There is a partnership between the
Department of Education and Science (DES) and local school authorities which illustrates the preference for consensual decision
making. K.irp notes tha.t such an approach to decision making effectively limits race specific policy initiatives because officials would regard them as too dramatic.
DES has continued to pursue a policy of inexplicitness with respect to race and schooling, and has consistently defined educational
problems posed by the nonwhite presence in nonracial terms: as reflecting language difficulties or a lack of cultural familiarity, or as an
indistinguishable aspect of the dilemmas associated with educational
disadvantage generally. This approach has been presumed "likely to
achieve more for racial minorities in the long run, and with rather
less social pain, than the alternative of a more overtly racial focus"
(p. 54). Adhering to this rubric, DES has been unwilling even to
maintain a count of nonwhites in British schools.
K.irp does not :find that the British policy of "doing good by
stealth" (p. 65) has served to provide nonwhites with tangible benefits in school funding. Nevertheless, he questions whether Britain's
racial minorities would have been better served by a British
equivalent of the more specific American programs like Title I of the
1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act, in which bookkeeping concerns as to whether eligible children were benefiting have
often taken precedence over educational concerns. He thinks racial
inexplicitness can best be appreciated as "one plausible approach to
a set of immensely troubling issues" (p. 66).
The British commitment to racially inexplicit school policies was
likely strengthened by their unhappy experiments with busing. Actually, a prerequisite for racially neutral policies is a relatively small
percentage of minorities, and nonwhites constitute only about 4% of
the primary and secondary British population (p. 1). In addition,
inexplicit policies are a comfortable means of proceeding with an
unorganized minority community. Yet by the 1960s, substantial
numbers of nonwhites had settled, in particular London suburbs,
threatening these foundations of racially neutral policies. When the
Beaconsfield Road School became 60% nonwhite, white parents
organized to protest the "racial invasion," and "hostilities between
whites and Indians flared" (p. 74). Perhaps in part to insure the continuance of the small percentage, unorganized minority community
model, the dispersal via busing of 3,000 nonwhite children was begun.
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The British government turned to busing as a means to prevent
schools from becoming "irretrievably immigrant" schools (p. 74).
There were no claims that busing would improve the educational
opportunities or achievements of nonwhite students, and white students were never considered for busing. The sole purpose was to
"render newcomers relatively invisible and hence unthreatening to
whites" (p. 75). DES saw dispersal as "enabling nonwhites to 'fit in
with reasonable ease,' " indicating that "[r]acial invisibility . . . was
good for nonwhites as well as whites" (p. 76).
In the London borough of Ealing, the busing experiment was
taken very seriously. A substantial amount of effort and expense was
invested in the program. Nonwhite children underwent elaborate
testing to assess their knowledge of English before they were transferred to white schools. Specially trained teachers were hired to
teach English to those children experiencing problems with it. Nonwhite students were admitted to grammar schools on the basis of
their intellectual promise despite grades which would not ordinarily
have entitled them to admission, a fact Kirp suggests indicates a willingness to undertake extraordinary measures on behalf of nonwhites.
In 1975 a DES official praised the program highly, both for the quality of education received by the nonwhite students and for the experiment in race relations (p. 89). The success of the busing project in
Ealing became a source of pride for local school officials. They came
to see dispersal as done for the benefit of immigrant children rather
than for the original purpose of allaying the "immigrant takeover"
fears of whites.
In the United States, busing is urged by civil rights lawyers as the
best means to insure equal educational opportunity for black children. But in practice, so many concessions must be made to meet the
fears and concerns of whites in the integrated school that few integrated schools can boast of real academic improvement for its black
students. In the meantime, white resistance to the busing program
continues.
In Britain, too, there was discontent almost immediately. Some
local school officials were upset because the DES initiative seemed to
ignore, or even to usurp, their role in the traditional governance
partnership. There were also the usual administrative difficulties associated with large-scale busing. And even nonwhite parents, who
initially had accepted the policy, began to complain that busing was
discriminatory and insulting. They claimed that busing denied
them, as nonwhite parents, the choices of schools available to white
parents. Political considerations also forced a reconsideration of the
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program. Nonwhites in these areas represented 30% of the population (up from 10%). DES officials found there were too few white
children in the area to maintain the designated proportion of whites,
and they deemed busing white children to be politically unfeasible.
By the late 1970s, DES had abandoned its dispersal program,
leaving the policy choice of whether to continue busing in local
hands. In Southall, the local authorities decided to build new
schools which would primarily serve nonwhite children; construction
was now a " politically easier course of action than trying somehow
to press on with busing" (p. 92). Ealing authorities had decided to
follow suit when they were sued by the government's Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration. The Committee charged
that busing and the whole dispersal policy was discriminatory because it was based on race rather than educational need. In 1978 the
parties settled, with Ealing agreeing to disperse "only on grounds of
demonstrated educational need, not race" (p. 99). Kirp suggests that
busing was a deviation from the traditional British policy of inexplicitness, and was ultimately abandoned because of "an ideologically and politically rooted reluctance to single out nonwhites for
any purpose, whether allegedly benevolent or malign" (p. 71 ).
In summary, Kirp states that in the fifteen years since racial inexplicitness has been the predominant social policy as regards race,
nonwhites have made considerable progress. "The race relations climate is more hopeful and there is less overt discrimination" (p. 114).
He dismisses the minimal gains of minorities in economic and social
mobility after a decade of this policy, stating that the goal of an educational policy of inexplicitness is to educate, not to remake the social order.
Kirp does acknowledge that "there remain substantial gaps between the groups. Some of these gaps are attributable to disadvantage associated with race" (p. 114). However, he says that it is
difficult to determine whether a more vigorous and directed public
policy would have caused an even greater amelioration of racial inequalities.
Kirp ends his discussion with a comparison of the British and the
American approaches to race. After detailing the historical and
demographic differences between the two, Kirp describes the differences between decision making processes. The United States adheres to a legalist approach. The judiciary and administrative
agencies act as problem solvers and as the primary enforcers of the
law. In England, Parliament controls the decision making process.
Administrative agencies such as DES use informal inquiry and ad
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hoc agreements to determine policy rather than making court-like
statements of right.
Despite these differences, Kirp seems to think that the United
States may be leaning toward a policy of racial inexplicitness. There
is a current trend toward less emphasis on race and more on economic discrimination. Racial explicitness, at least with respect to
hiring and university admissions, provokes hostility, and Kirp interprets Justice Powell's opinion in the Supreme Court's Bakke decision 12 as enunciating a "constitutional value in not being too racespecific" (p. 128). In other words, there is an "insist[ence] upon inexplicitness as the constitutionally mandated policy choice" (p. 128).
As for Britain, Kirp perceives there a combining of "the considerable virtues of inexplicitness with both a greater willingness to incorporate nonwhite groups into the relevant decision making and
consultative apparatuses, and a recognition that discrimination . . .
deserves more serious public policy attention than it has thus far received (p. 129). He recognizes that effective civil rights policies require that "attention be paid to practices which, while not overtly
racial, nonetheless operate to disadvantage racial minorities without
adequate justification" (pp. 129-30). But he holds to the view that
racial inexplicitness need not necessarily imply inattentiveness.
This point of view, Kirp acknowledges, places old civil rights
warriors in this country on their guard. They remember all too well
the "benign neglect" admonition of Daniel Moynihan during the
early 1970s. Kirp suggests that Moynihan may simply have been
urging that more civil rights progress could be made if less public
attention were focused on the issue. Nevertheless, civil rights liberals
viewed Moynihan's suggestion as a morally bankrupt response to
America's history of discrimination.
Civil rights leaders are not likely to be more sanguine about the
"benign neglect" approach today, even if it is clothed in more neutral "racial inexplicitness" language. In too many areas during the
past decade, they have experienced a loss of recently won rights as a
result of the adoption of policies facially neutral as to race, but
which in operation have the effect of disadvantaging blacks. In a
series of cases, the Supreme Court has held that such policies do not
violate constitutional rights unless blacks can prove that they were
intentionally adopted to discriminate on the basis of race. 13 In many
instances, this burden of proof is extremely difficult to meet because
12. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
13. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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the policies arguably further some legitimate, nonracial goal. 14 For
these reasons, black leaders would oppose any effort to adopt in this
country the racially inexplicit approach Kirp finds that Britain has
used as vigorously as they condemned the Moynihan proposal,
which they viewed as a "calculated, aggressive and systematic effort
... to wipe out all the civil rights gains made in the 1950s and
1960s" (p. 109).
And yet there is a problem. Many thoughtful blacks have wondered in recent years whether the direct approach in the civil rights
field has lost its effectiveness. Professor William J. Wilson argues
that poverty, and not racial discrimination, is now the chief obstacle
to black progress. 15 He acknowledges that past discrimination has
consigned a disproportionate number of blacks to permanent poverty status, but he argues that more civil rights laws are not going to
improve their condition. He warns moreover that a deepening economic schism seems to be developing in the black community, with
the black poor falling further and further behind middle- and upperincome blacks. 16 It is clear that blacks with skills and education
have been able to take best advantage of the new opportunities created by civil rights laws and affirmative action policies. Indeed, Wilson suggests that the very presence of these civil rights measures
tends to harden public resistance to the broader-scale measures
needed to alleviate the plight of the black poor.
Wilson views the large, black underclass as "one of the legacies
of the racial oppression in previous years." For its remediation, he
calls for public policy programs that attack inequality on a broad
class front and "go beyond the limits of ethnic and racial discrimination by directly confronting the pervasive and destructive features of
class subordination." 17 In effect, Wilson is urging that racially inexplicit policies be adopted. Applying this standard to current school
desegregation problems in this country, he would likely approve policies that give less emphasis to racial balance and busing, and greater
emphasis to educational programs intended to upgrade the quality of
schooling for blacks wherever they attend school. To the extent that
black children remain in identifiably black institutions, educational
improvement, rather than racial-balance remedies, would likely win
14. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), finding an at-large electoral
system not in violation of black rights even though it serves to dilute the voting strength of
blacks, because there was no proof that the system was intended to violate the voting rights of
blacks.
15. See w. WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 151-52 (1978).
16. See id at 151-54.
17. See id at 154.
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his vote. The Supreme Court seems to have tried to encourage
school desegregation policymaking along this route. 18 But most civil
rights leaders are understandably wary that such policies would portend a return to the separate but equal policies condemned in Brown,
and they are unalterably opposed to any retreat from the right to
maximum feasible school desegregation recognized by the Court. 19
Interestingly enough, it is likely that both civil rights adherents
who favor racial balance policies and those who would prefer educational improvement would be deeply suspicious of the racially inexplicit approach presented in .Doing Good By .Doing Little. Racism is
too ingrained in American society to be eradicated by indirection.
"Doing good by stealth" seems, at least in the American context, a
contradiction in terms. A more serious problem is whether, regardless of the policy adopted, racial subordination which has served so
many white interests so well can ever be eliminated. Public policy
expert Tilden W. LeMelle doubts "whether a society such as the
United States is really capable of legislating and enforcing effective
public policy to combat racial discrimination" in the political process
and elsewhere.20 And, as he suggests, history indicates that the
United States has acted effectively against racially discriminatory
policies only when those policies were perceived as posing a serious
threat to the country rather than serving as useful regulators of the
status quo. 21
In concluding .Doing Good By .Doing Little, David Kirp calls for
public policy in the racial realm "that neither becomes officious intermeddling nor degenerates into mere neglect, with the result that
race eventually ceases to be a policy problem" (p. 133). As to the
likelihood of such policies being adopted in either nation, Kirp says
"it is far too soon even to hazard predictions" (p. 133). Kirp may be
right, but there is not unlimited time in which to decide whether a
sensible as well as moral approach to race relations can be effected.
"The fire next time" will not always be a future event.

18. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
19. See, e.g., Taylor, Columbus and Dayton: A Renewed Commitment lo Equality," 3 LE·
GAL ANALYSIS: TRENDS IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION LAW (Natl. Project and Task Force on
Desegregation Strategies, Oct. I 979).
20. LeMelle, Foreword lo R Burkey, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES X (1971).
21. D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW, § 1.12 {2d ed. 1980).

